Donna
Chapman Philosophy 455
donna@sypub.com Adv. Philosophy of
Mind
October
26, 2004
Fall 2004
The Universalist View of
Emotion
The question put forth here is: Are there
basic universal emotions or patterns of emotional response that every human
being shares. Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, Charles Darwin, and Paul Ekman
all think so. Descartes and Spinoza both believe that these emotions originate
in the realm of Òmental substanceÓ, and result from Òmental processesÓ. Darwin
and Ekman believe that these emotions are part of our genetic code. Interesting
variations exist between Descartes and Spinoza, and between Darwin and Ekman,
in terms of exactly how these processes occur (Descartes/Spinoza), and how they
become part of our genetic code (Darwin/Ekman).
I
am presenting the theory of each view separately. But will discuss
Descartes/Spinoza together, and Darwin/Ekman together. I do this because the
theories piggy back off of each other.
This paper will conclude with a discussion of the merits of each, and my
opinion concerning the viability of any or all of the theories put forth.
Descartes
Descartes
would say that the soul exists because we think about it. There are two types of thoughts that we
think about our souls – Actions of the Soul and Passions of the Soul.
Actions of the Soul are desires originating in the soul, and of the soul with
no external, finite causality. Passions of the soul are responses in the soul
and body based on sense impressions or sense data and how we value it. Passions
would be the impetus for experience based fear for example – my fear of
flying is based on a bomb scare experience on a 747 18 years ago. Desires are
an ÒotherÓ thing. They have two parts, actions of soul, such as desire to know
God, and actions of body wherein we wish to walk across the room, so our legs
animate and we move across the room.
Both
Actions and Passions of the Soul are caused and maintained by information
elicitors called Òanimal spiritsÓ. Animal spirits are present in the blood, and
serve to agitate the passions in a bi-directional fashion. Descartes implies
that animal spirits can either excite an emotion based on sense impression, or
they can excite an emotion based on the desires of the soul – hence the
bi-directional reference. They excite and drive the soul to want to act. For example in the case of fear,
animal spirits excite the soul to want to run. In the case of courage, animal
spirits make the soul want to stand and fight. On the other hand, they drive
the soul to willingly bond with objects that it sees as pleasant or worth
having as in the case of love, with no apparent physical connection at all.
This
is a mechanical process. To diagram the process, IÕll examine the emotion
ÒfearÓ. Fear is usually rooted in a mental image initially related to a sense
impression most of the time. Such as, I was bitten by a dog once, so now IÕm
afraid of dogs. So IÕll use the example of seeing a dog. The Òheat of the
heartÓ circulates blood and animal spirits throughout the body. When I see a
dog coming toward me, the animal spirits pass through pores in my brain to the
place where the impression of Òdog biting meÓ resides, along with its
associated feelings. The animal spirits are excited by apprehension or fear or
a combination of other emotions, the intensity of which is determined by the
intensity of the mental impression of Òdog biting meÓ that is stored in my
brain. The animal spirits move to the pineal gland in the brain, and excite it
to motion. When the gland vibrates, the animal spirits are able to pass through
it into the circulatory system and on to the glands that control the heart beat
(pumps faster), and the legs (prepare for flight). They also circle back to the
brain (through the pineal gland again) to maintain and strengthen the passion
of fear. The degree of intensity of the initial impression (could be a memory
of an actual sense experience) is determined by my judgment as to the import of
it.
Under
most circumstances reason can supervene the passions, particularly in the case
of actions of the soul. The soul can act in harmony with reason and control the
emotion /passion. However sometimes the soul and the animal spirits conflict
with one another. Such is the case of raging anger. In this case the animal
spirits are agitating the body/muscles with such strength and persistence that
the soul has no control over them, and reason cannot surface. It is much more
difficult for reason to supervene on passions of the soul because of their root
in reality (a physical sense impression).
Descartes
outlines six emotions of a special type. He calls them Òprimitive passionsÓ
because he believes that that they are innate, a-priori, in all human beings. They
are Òfirst causeÓ impressions of: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and
sadness. By Òfirst causeÓ I mean that animal spirits excite Òactions of the
soulÓ to turn its attention to a type of mental state that he calls an
Òimmaterial mental stateÓ. Descartes
would say that these emotions (the immaterial mental states that are the basic
six) exist Òa prioriÓ,
as innate states without previous input of any kind. He would also say that God
put them there. (Descartes also
considers knowledge of logical principle and mathematics, and the knowledge of God all Òa prioriÓ or innate.) All of the other states that
we call ÒemotionsÓ are either subsets of the original basic six or combinations
of them with or without a sense impression connection. These secondary emotions
are differentiated further by desire (move to want for a future good, or
impending need) and the excitations or elicitations of the animal spirits based
on how significant to us the impression are that they are connected with, and
how many senses they actually affect.
So
let us break down a secondary emotion, agent – an event occurs that
causes the soul to apply itself to thinking about an object or person which
seems contradictory/antagonistic/upsetting to I, associating these thoughts to
the impression in the brain representing the object as someone or something to
get angry about. The animal spirits are then attracted to the areas of basic
emotions involved with the impression to intensify it and strengthen it. In the case of anger we may be thinking
about hatred, desire truncated (didnÕt get what I want), and perhaps even
sadness (sadness might add a spin of disappointment to the mix) They are
driven, by exciting the pineal gland, to pass through it to the muscles that
control the sense organs causing them to react: blood pressure goes up, jaws
may clinch, fists may clinch, yelling may occur etc in proportion to the judgment
I make about the importance of the issue that has triggered the anger.
Spinoza
Spinoza
believed that emotions are modes of imagining. They are misunderstandings based
on flawed information. He is a bit of a Stoic in his thinking. He regards
emotions as irrational responses which should be under the control of reason.
Obviously there are emotional situations that appear to be Òout of controlÓ
therefore they must be created out of some sort of misunderstanding or bad
information input. Why else would we exhibit such irrational behavior?
Emotions
have their origin in ÒaffectsÓ. The root of an affect is the concept of ÒstrivingÓ
(desire/dukah – an eastern concept). All people possess as a part of
their nature an instinct for survival both in a figurative sense and in a
literal sense. Striving to preserve oneÕs being is conatus. Striving to preserve ones mind and body
– an existential survival – is called an appetite. When an appetite becomes conscious, it
is ÒdesireÓ the first of SpinozaÕs basic emotions of affects. As we experience,
or become aware of higher degrees of being, or perfection, we experience
ÒpleasureÓ. If we experience a reduction of perfection, or we are distracted
from striving to preserve our being, we experience ÒpainÓ. All other emotions
are a subset of desire, pleasure or pain. The degree to which we can
differentiate good and evil is relative to the level of intuitive perfection
(knowledge) that we have attained. Pity, for example is a type of sadness
arising from another persons injury or misfortune. To experience pity is to
experience a decrease in oneÕs own power to preserve being. Spinoza builds in
his ÒoutÓ here. He defines intuitive perfection/knowledge as relative to our
innate desire to strive for God. The more knowledge we have (the more perfect
our powers of reason) the more God-like we are.
Spinoza
offers a further differentiation of emotion type: passions and actions.
Passions are desires attached to inadequate ideas. Passions occur outside of
us. Actions are desires attached to adequate ideas. They occur within us as the
result of our nature. It is through
passions and actions relative to the basic three desire, pleasure and pain,
that the vast body of emotions of various flavor and intensity are generated.
Spinoza
believes that only knowledge can lead to happiness. Happiness is breaking our
slavery to our passions. If we donÕt understand our emotions, or when our
desires attach to finite things, things that can be destroyed, then we are
enslaved by our passions. The more we understand our emotions, the less power
our appetites and desires will have and the happier we will be.
Descartes/Spinoza Evaluation
Neither
Descartes nor Spinoza actually did any experiments to prove their theories of
emotions. They both believe that reason should suffice. Vis: If we can think, then we can think
about emotions. And because we can think about emotions, the result attained
through reasoning must be correct.
They didnÕt experiment because they didnÕt think they needed to.
Descartes
has written a philosophy based on reason. All his power lies in being able to
think through a problem whether it be mathematical or ethical or emotional. He
never asks the question Òis it appropriate to apply my theory of mental
processes to emotions?Ó . He assumes that it does, and proceeds to shoe horn
his observations of emotional behavior into his Òmethod of reasonÓ. When he hits the wall with questions
like – Òhow ARE these emotions innate?, and Òhow DOES everyone have
them?Ó – he throws the God card.
Descartes
does have something interesting going on in the nature of the process. What if the concept of animal
spirits/pineal gland notion pertains more to the hormones and endocrine system.
Hormones are capable of profound almost instantaneous mood change. They have
powerful impact on us physically and mentally. We can be laughing one minute
and crying the next. Perhaps these are the actual Òanimal spiritsÓ about whom
he refers.
Spinoza
also has a mental process approach, but itÕs based on a more primal set of
emotions. Descartes never really develops why the basic emotions are such elaborate
constructs as love, hate wonder, desire, joy and sadness. He, no doubt, settled on them from a
purely mathematical sense: he couldnÕt break them down into any lesser
elements. Spinoza does this very well and I think that there is merit to it.
He
does however skirt dangerously the area of Òpsychological egoismÓ or the notion
that we are constituted to only look out for our own interests. If we are
indeed pleasure/pain/desire driven then at the very essence of our emotion
process - we will avoid pain at all costs, and try to maintain a pleasure
state. He does not account for the supervening of this process. Such a case
would be that of an action involving personal sacrifice.
Spinoza
also tiptoes into some very interesting territory when he uses the word
ÒstrivingÓ. This has a strongly Eastern flavor (dukah/desire). It is
interesting that he never takes the plunge to venture down the path Òwhat would
happen if we tried to dis-identify with ÒstrivingÓ?
Interestingly..neither
Descartes nor Spinoza ever actually state that everyone has these innate basic
emotions. However, the nature of their theories about reason apply to every
one. ALL humans think therefore ALL humans are. All human machines work this
way. There is no need to state that all humans have these emotions because they
are talking about all humans in the structure of their theories. (obvious exceptions are mentally
damaged people, or in the case of the timeline of Darwin and Spoinoza..women!
men think, women didnÕt)
Darwin
Darwin
believes that emotions in humans and emotional displays in animals have similar
origins. The watchword of his theory is ÒserviceabilityÓ. The term
ÒserviceabilityÓ applies to purposefulness or usefulness. Which emotions or behaviors are
necessary vs unnecessary to an individuals survival. Everything we do has
purpose, and most of the time our emotional reactions to given stimulus are
useful. Over time these purposeful, useful emotions/behaviors become
genetically hardwired into us ensuring the survival or our species.
Sometimes
the triggers of these useful emotions modify through natural selection, based
on societal need, environmental need or other factors. Sometimes through specialization
behaviors become unnecessary and drop out altogether. But the bottom line is
that at some point emotions started out external to us as experience, and
through repetition and habitual practice became genetically part of us.
Natural
selection suggests that any behavioral change, no matter how small, if useful
(serviceable) is preserved, if not useful is discarded. Natural selection is
the key to DarwinÕs theory that emotions are hard wired genetic responses. He
believes that they are somehow hard wired because he observed certain emotional
displays which crossed cultural and economic boundaries.
Darwin
theorized three principles concerning the development and proliferation of
emotional behaviors. The first principle answers the origin of the behaviors.
It says that certain events or needs elicit certain useful mental states and
certain useful behavior. These
mental states attach to each other fear, run etc. The second principle answers the question Òwhere did the
tremendous variety of human emotions come from?Ó All emotions have a
physiological component and a sensory component. In a dualist sense, if there
is one emotion there must also exist its polar opposite, and antithetical
position. This antithetical emotion also has an associated antithetical
physiological component and an antithetical sensory component. The third
principle explains physiological reactions triggered by emotion which persists
after the emotion passes., such as trembling. Darwin considers these
physiological occurrences to be independent stand alone emotional events. They
occur independent of the will and independent of genetic hard wiring. Emotions as we know them are constructs
based on these three principles.
Darwin
does not name specific emotions, but through extensive and detailed observation
of facial expression, he hoped to answer the question: ÒWhy does an emotion
occur?Ó He is the first to approach this question. Descartes and Spinoza have
mainly been concerned with why and how emotions occur. Darwin thought that
facial expression was connected with why because, for example, he observed that
a smile usually elicits a pleasant response in an individual. This occurs
whether the smile comes from the individual themselves or from another person.
He makes the jump to a universalist statement because he observed the same
facial expressions connected with the same emotions in various countries around
the world. These responses were common whether the country was developed or
not.
Ekman
Paul
Ekman originally set out to disprove DarwinÕs theory of universal genetic
emotional expression, but his own experimentation not only proved it (by his evaluations
of the results), but also actually implied that there are six basic namable
emotions. They are: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust.
While Darwin made conclusions about gross
behaviors (Darwin did include his own evaluation of facial expression Ekman,
observed the minutiae of muscle movements and their timing – particularly
of the human face – and produced an extremely accurate measurement system
for what he terms ÒemotionsÓ. He is guilty of heavily implying that facial
expressions are
emotions. There are several obvious problems with this claim. For example, if
facial expression is emotion, then why donÕt we ÒfeelÓ angry every time we
frown? What about actors? Do they ÒexperienceÓ the emotions that they create
the external structure of at will? His point of view for his observations is an
exterior view. He is observing activity that is occurring inside an individual,
evidenced by the manifestation of facial expression, and other physiological
occurrences.
Ekman broke down the
mental/sociological/biological process into of the emotional expression into
what he terms Òaffect programsÓ.
An affect program has a structure that models much the way a computer
collects and parses information from relational databases. The Òaffect programÓ
is the master code. It is a routine that ÒcallsÓ and directs emotional
responses from a multitude of databases such as our experiences, our memories,
our expectations, our gene pool, our goals and aspirations. He believes that
this code is genetic. This code updates and overwrites itself over time as we
grow and mature. We have to learn to acquire control of our emotional
expression, but the way we control them when we are10 years old is very
different than the way we control them at 30 (hopefully). The next element of
the program is the Òappraisal systemÓ. The appraisal system decides when to
trigger an affect program. Timing is everything! We also need a way to decide
which affect program to run. This
job is accomplished by the ÒelicitorÓ. Now whatÕs the program output
(facial expression) going to look like to the rest of the world? And, will any
facial expression do? Shall a smile always be a huge toothy grin? We have the
Òdisplay rulesÕ to handle those decisions. The last element of the program is the
Òcoping mechanismÓ. This is the engine that lets us deal psychologically with
the source of the emotional trigger event.
Emotional responses have finite
attributes. Emotional responses are brief, usually lasting just a few seconds.
Ekman differentiates emotions which last for a considerably longer duration
(like days or weeks) as ÒmoodsÓ. Emotional responses are quick. The appraisal
system, along with the elicitor, look up the appropriate (maybe, or not) affect
program very rapidly and run it. Emotional responses are complex. As from a
central core, the responses called by the affect program spoke out to many
physiological systems almost simultaneously. It is not a linear process, it is
a nexus. Palms sweat at the same time that hearts race, at the same time that
eyes widen, at the same time that respiration becomes quick and shallow, at the
same time that mouth opens to scream perhaps in the case of fear. Emotional
responses are organized. They are constructs of experience, biofeedback,
memories and expectations – all serving to temper the quality of an
emotional event. Emotional responses are hard to control. Although facial
expressions can be supervened by the will. Consciously controlling heart and
respiration rates and sweaty palms is impossible.
Ekman considers facial expression to be a
necessary component of the qualia of an emotion, but not the identity of the
emotional event. (contradicts himself a bit here). For example, if an emotion
occurs, vis happiness, which has a trigger for facial expression, vis a smile,
and the individual willfully supervenes the facial expression, vis frowns, the
person is still happy, but not as happy as if they had smiled.
Ekman believes that he proved his theory
through experimentation. To eliminate the contamination of modern media
exposure, he traveled to New Guinea to study the people of the South Fore.
(whether or not this is true is debatable) These were a relatively illiterate
people who had not been exposed to many outsiders. They were shown photos of
faces expressing emotions and were asked to identify the emotion being
expressed. Inversely they were asked to express a particular emotion
themselves. It was found that the expression of happiness, sadness, anger and
disgust all seemed to have universal content. That is, they expressed these
emotions physiologically (by facial expression) the same way that we do , and
as does everyone else in the world. There were two exceptions to EkmanÕs
confirmation of universal emotions. The exceptions were fear and surprise. These
emotions have shared expressive elements, so although they were differentiated
from the fist 4 emotions, but could not be differentiated from each other.
Based on the analysis of the results of
this experiment, and many more like it, Ekman determined that there are six
basic emotions – happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust
– and the way that they are expressed (based on facial expressions) is
genetically encoded into each human being and although the expression of the
emotion is the same for all, the events which trigger the responses can and do
vary from society to society based on cultural and socio economic influences.
Darwin/Ekman Evaluation
In all of the reference material that I
read I found that Darwin was careful to say Òemotions in humansÓ and Òemotional
displaysÓ in animals. Why is DarwinÕs ÒemotionÓ in a human different from an
Òemotional displayÓ in an animal? He does not seem to see that he is observing
behavior only on both counts. He is external to and isolated from the actual
emotional event. He is observing emotional displays on both countsÉhe is not
documenting an emotion.
Whereas
Descartes and Spinoza regard emotion as originating within us as type of mental
state (in other words, they exist as a mental mechanical process) Darwin
observed displays of emotional behavior and plugged them right into his
evolutionary theory, and decided that they were genetic, selected by usability
etc.
Darwin
also thinks that emotions trigger more easily over time because of habit. I think that there is
some sense to this. But an interesting question is: Òwhat motivates this ease?Ó
Ethics? Social Constructivism?
Codependence?
Darwin
believes that everyone experiences the same emotional response because of the
commonality of facial expression that he observed during his documentation
period. By virtue of his application of natural selection theory, these
emotional responses are genetic to all people.
Every
resource element that I read about Paul Ekman expressed concerns about his implication
that facial expressions ARE emotionsÉhe never comes right out and says it but
the tone of his writing heavily implies that he thinks that this is the case.
DarwinÕs
explanation of genetic encoding through natural selection was EkmanÕs deal
closer in terms of answering the question of how do we all have these emotions.
Both
allow for cultural relativism and they both do an excellent job of documenting
emotional responses, and certainly there is a credibility to the notion that
emotional responses may be universal, however they have not really said much
about true emotional experiences.
Conclusion
All four are motivated by credibility.
They all shoe horn emotions into their original thesis statements. They all
think that if it works for one area it will work for all. They donÕt ask
necessary questions such as ÒDoes my theory fit what I am observing about
emotions?Ó They just make them
fit.
DescartesÕ
motivation is to lend credibility to his Òmethod of reasonÓ. He has created a
mechanistic theory of how the body and mind work based on dual substance, and
he believes that all mental processes fit within this model. It does not
necessarily follow that emotions work the same way that thinking does.
SpinozaÕs
motivation is to clear the waters a bit. He likes Descartes, but wants a more
up front theological commitment. Emotions are very simply a matter of a drive
to ensure survival, and our reason is mitigated by a desire to know or be like
God. He is also lending credibility to his philosophy at large by applying the
principles to every aspect of the human state again without regard for the
appropriateness of it.
Although
Descartes and Spinoza both outline very competently a possible process of feeling an emotion, neither of them ever
actually define what an emotion is! They claim it but have not proven it.
Darwin
is particularly obvious in his attempt to shape the origins of emotions within
the framework of his theory of
Evolution Through Natural Selection.
Ekman
has observed in microscopic detail the physical evidence of emotional response
in terms of facial expression, and DarwinÕs theory on the genetic nature of
these responses is the glue that holds it together. But neither he nor Darwin ever actually prove that the
responses that they are documenting ARE in fact emotions. They want them to be,
but havenÕt proven anything.
The determination of the universality of
emotion ends up being an issue of emotional experiences vs emotional responses.
One can observe an emotional response but one cannot observe an emotional
experience. Darwin/Ekman are only detailing emotional responses. Descartes and
Spinoza try to express the emotional experience in terms of process.
I like DescartesÕ notion of animal spirits..but I think
they are probably hormones and the endocrine system. From Spinoza I like the primal drive
emotions..desire/pleasure/pain relative to survival. From Darwin I like his
idea of emotions being easier to trigger based on habit and repetition. And
from Ekman I like the concept of affect programs. I have a feeling that the
actual mechanism for emotion probably works something like an affect program. I
think that the actual process of experiencing an emotion must be a combination
of these. But there is something ÒotherÓ. There is something beyond what we can
describe from within our physiological shells that is ÒemotionÓ. The bottom line for me is: All
descriptions or attempted definitions of what an emotion is fall short. No one
to date has actually gotten it right. It seems that once one area is focused
upon in detail, another aspect of the emotional experience is neglected. This
concept is understood in Taoism. Once you try to communicate what the Tao is,
you have lost it. So far the same seems to be true of emotions. I think that an
emotional experience is something other than the sum of itÕs parts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
What is an
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2003
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Daniel
Garber, 1998, 2003, Routeledge Encyclopedia of
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material downloaded from:
http://www.paulekman.com/articles.php
Emotions Inside
Out, Ekman, P., Campos, J., Davidson R.J., De
Walls,
F. 2003 volume 1000. New York: Annals of the New
York
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PDF Version of
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Expressions
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and T. Power (Eds)
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