Donna
Chapman
Religious Studies 361
donna@sypub.com Honors
Moral Ethics
October
26, 2004
Fall 2004
What, If Any Is the
Connection
Between Emotions and
Ethics/Moral Value Judgments – An Overview of Theory
The question put forth here is: What is
the nature of the connection between Emotions and Ethics/Moral Value Judgments.
Historically philosophers and psychologists have had varying approaches to the
question. These opinions range from the Òemotions must be conquered, only an
emotion free decision is true reasonÓ position of the Stoics to David HumeÕs
ÒReason is and ought only to be the slave of the passionsÓ[1].
I
am presenting here an overview of two opposing views - Darwin and Hume, and two
contemporary views that are similar to each other – Michael Stocker and
Jesse Prinz. I will give a brief
exposition of each view, then I will discuss Hume/Darwin together, and
Stocker/Prinz together. I do this because the problems of the historical views
are classic problems in terms of ethical analysis. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the merits of
each, and my opinion concerning the viability of any or all of the theories put
forth.
Darwin
The
watchword of his theory is ÒserviceabilityÓ. The term ÒserviceabilityÓ applies
to purposefulness or usefulness.
Which emotions or ethical behaviors are necessary vs unnecessary to an
individualÕs survival? Everything we do has purpose, and most of the time our
emotional reactions to given stimulus are useful. Over time these purposeful,
useful emotions/behaviors become genetically hardwired into us ensuring the
survival or our species. Darwin believes that our sense of ethics or moral
judgments also evolves in this way. Always the focus is on useful behaviors for
the survival of our species.
Sometimes
the triggers of these useful emotions modify through natural selection, based
on cultural relativism, environmental need or other factors. Sometimes through specialization
behaviors become unnecessary and drop out altogether. But the bottom line is
that at some point emotions and ethics started out external to us as
experience, and through repetition and habitual practice became genetically
part of us.
Natural
selection suggests that any behavioral change, no matter how small, if useful
(serviceable), is preserved, if not useful it is discarded. Natural selection
is the key to DarwinÕs theory that ethics are hard wired genetic responses. He
believes that they are somehow hard wired because he observed certain ethical
behaviors or moral values which crossed cultural and economic boundaries. The
only connection that Darwin holds for emotions relative to ethics/moral
judgment is in that they are both genetic processes programmed in us over time.
He does not see any absolute or implied connection between emotions and moral
values.
Darwin
theorized three principles concerning the development and proliferation of
emotional behaviors. The first principle answers the origin of the behaviors.
It says that certain events or needs elicit certain useful mental states and
certain useful behavior. These
mental states attach to each other fear, run etc. The second principle answers the question Òwhere did the
tremendous variety of human emotions come from?Ó All emotions have a
physiological component and a sensory component. In a dualist sense, if there
is one emotion there must also exist its polar opposite, and antithetical
position. This antithetical emotion also has an associated antithetical
physiological component and an antithetical sensory component. The third
principle explains physiological reactions triggered by emotion which persists
after the emotion passes., such as trembling. Darwin considers these physiological
occurrences to be independent stand alone emotional events. They occur
independent of the will and independent of genetic hard wiring. Emotions as we know them are constructs
based on these three principles.
Darwin
does not name specific emotions, but through extensive and detailed observation
of facial expression and their related social behavior patterns, he hoped to
answer the question: ÒWhy does an emotion or particular moral value judgment
occur?Ó He is the first to approach this question. Darwin thought that facial
expression was connected with why because, for example, he observed that a
smile usually elicits a pleasant social behavior in an individual. This occurs
whether the smile comes from the individual themselves or from another person. Conversely there were specific
behaviors associated with anger and other negative emotions. He makes the jump
to a Universalist statement because he observed the same facial expressions
connected with the same emotions in various countries around the world. These
responses were common whether the country was developed or not.
A
singular problem with DarwinÕs approach is his assumption of truth. He assumes
that an expression of happiness truly represents happiness enough to be
considered happiness. He has been criticized by modern psychologists such as
Paul Ekman for his lack of investigation into the nature of dishonest ethical
behaviors such as willful deception. He also assumes that the ÒnecessaryÓ
situations which become part of our genetic structure are all real. Darwin does not take ÒimaginedÓ emotions
into account at all. He assumes that these would be un-necessary and as such
would be dropped through the process of specialization.
Hume
ÒReason is and ought only to be the slave
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and
obey themÓ[2]
David Hume is an empiricist, therefore
connecting emotions (feelings) with valid moral judgments is an easy leap for
him. He says that something being morally good or morally bad is a state that
exists because there is a sentiment (feeling) towards that thing. He does not speak of the ÒoriginsÓ of
emotions, but he does say a lot ÒaboutÓ them and their relationship to our
ethics/moral judgments. In his ÒTreatise on Human NatureÓ he takes a semantic
approach suggesting that because all knowledge is based on data from our senses
(empiricism), we therefore cannot ÒknowÓ that something is wrong because we
cannot directly perceive ÒwrongnessÓ with any of our senses. He uses logical argument
as his cornerstone. A logical argument is false if the conclusion cannot be
reached from the premises. For example
I
saw someone murdered.
Society is against murder.
Therefore
murder is wrong.
It is a fact that I saw someone murdered
(well not really but good for an example), and it is a fact that society is
against murder, however it does not follow that murder is wrong simply by
virtue of the list of facts above. Hume calls this the gap between ÒisÓ and
ÒoughtÓ. We can see a human destroyed..but we cannot see the wrongness of
murder. However, Hume says, we can assert a moral judgment which is true, if we
look at it from the point of view of semantics. When I say Òmurder is wrongÓ
what I am really saying is ÒI am against murderÓ. In this case Òmurder is
wrongÓ is a true statement for me. We cannot make global statements about ethics because we
cannot know their components empirically. Since the decision about moral values
is mainly based on semantics, what we mean by our language at any given time is
strongly influenced by our psychological state at the time of the statement
– in other words Òhow we feel about itÓ or our emotions intentionality
toward its object. Hume defines this as a Òmoral sentimentÓ. He believes that
without these moral sentiments we would never be motivated to do the right
thing and avoid the wrong.
Impressions are differentiated by quality
and intensity. There are two types of impressions: original (sensation) and
secondary (reflection). Sensations
are a primary sense experience sort of impression, while reflection is a
secondary sense experience type, or one step removed from the real thing. Vivid
spontaneous emotions are sensations, Memories of these sensations are
reflections.
Hume says that sensations arise in the
soul without any sort of direct perception, (but are nevertheless primary sense
experiences). They also arise from primary data from the physical senses. Reflections proceed from sensations.
Sensations pertain to direct sense data, while reflections are a lesser
version. Reflective impressions are of two types: calm and violent. Hume
further differentiates violent reflective impressions as ÒpassionsÓ. There are
two categories of passion: direct and indirect. Direct and indirect passions
each have their own distinct causation. Direct passions are caused as the name
implies, by feelings directly. They are unique instances like no other.
Emotions such as grief or joy are direct in that they are caused only by
feelings of pleasure or pain. Indirect passions are a composite of feeling and
intentionality, or belief about the object of the emotion. HumeÕs most detailed
extrapolation concerns the emotion of pride. In the case of pride, the
intentional object is the self.
Hume strongly asserts that emotions of
themselves are agnostic. They are neither good nor bad. Only the intentional
object renders the goodness or badness of an emotion. If the intentional object
is a moral judgment or an ethical view, then it can be swayed positive or
negative based on our approbation (sentiment) toward or against it at the time.
Emotions themselves are inherently benign.
If there is any ethical school that Hume
could be attached to it would be the Utilitarian school of thought. He is
utilitarian in the sense that we ÒoughtÓ to make moral decisions based on the
greater good for ourselves and everyone. He believes that this is a natural
ethical position because we are instinctively sympathetic human beings
naturally relating to one another, particularly in difficult times.
Now, although emotions are of themselves
agnostic, they can be ÒunreasonableÓ.
If the intentional object of an emotion proves to be false then the
emotion is unreasonable. One way
that this can happen would be if for some reason the intentional object does
not exist. Perhaps the case of unrequited love fits this model. The ÒloveÓ is
unreasonable because of the unavailability of the object of ones affections.
Another way for an emotion to become unreasonable is when we choose
insufficient means to achieve the desired end, or the greater good for
self/others. When this occurs we
usually experience a backlash emotion such as frustration or disappointment.
Our will to take action operates on a
presupposition that the desired action will be the cause of a desired affect. If
for some reason the presupposition proves false, the urge to take action
evaporates. In other words we stop caring about the issue..the sensation
disappears.
Hume takes issue with philosophers who
assume that if the observed results of a calm passion ÒappearÓ to be quiet and
introspective, then that IS reason! They go on to assume that violent passions
are ÒbadÓ because of their observable
agitation. He also warns against ascribing the action of the will to calm
passions exclusively. Both passions operate without weight and with out label.
But what has happened again is an issue of semantics. It is generally assumed
that Òcalm passionsÓ = strength of mind.
HumeÕs theory has several problems. The
most difficult to overcome is the potential for really non-reasonable behavior.
His view makes it completely acceptable to do something purely because we
desire it without any consideration for the well being of others, or even
common sense. Because we can desire to do anything, as long as the object of
our desire does not turn out to be flawed or non-existent. Anything goes.
Another problem is that heÕs an empiricist. He ascribes a rock solid dependence
on sense data input as criteria for all knowledge. He has just told us that
non-empirical entities exist (sensations/impressions). He says that we cannot
know what the passions are, then proceeds to describe them in empirical detail.
Like Darwin, Hume also assumes that these empirical experiences and
Òspontaneously generatedÓ (in the soul) experiences are all real. What about imagined emotions? What about
that unrequited love?
Darwin/Hume Evaluation
Darwin and Hume both are guilty of a
classic fault found often within moral philosophy and philosophy at large
– that is striving to prove a conclusion already drawn. Darwin has
decided that natural selection is the answer to every aspect of every
biological system on the planet. He then proceeds to ÒwriteÓ a method of
emotion and a method of ethics which adheres to his conclusion. Hume started with a generalized statement
about mental perceptions as impressions and ideas, the proceeds to tweek every
aspect of mental process to fit his model. Neither one has asked proper questions like Òdoes this
theory actually apply?Ó ÒAre there instances where it does not?Ó ÒWhat
differentiates the situations of appropriate application from the inappropriate
applications?Ó ÒDoes my theory really fit the emotional/moral value
judgment/ethical behavior that IÕm observing?
Additionally,
both do not take the matter of imagined feelings into account. Certainly it is
obvious that ingrained imagined emotions; for example paranoia, certain types
of fear, and irrational attraction or desire; all could be ingrained at the
genetic level, or could operate as ÒsensationsÓ in the Humean sense. Hume acknolowedges that emotions
can be unreasonable, therefore it is possible to respond to imaginary, or non
existant feelings with regard to an intentional object. Darwin provides a
mechanism for these un-founded feelings to become genetically part of our make
up.
In
his book ÒThe Sacred and the ProfaneÓ Mircea Eliade cites example after example
of mundane objects having transcendend ÒsacredÓ purpose. Some element of this transcendent
meaning comes from an imaginary position, or superstition. Over time, the
imaginary meaning becomes elemental to the identity of the object. Such can be
seen in the sacramental meaning of objects like the Òasherah poleÓ, or even the
Òark of the covenantÓ. Belief in
the perhaps imaginary identity of the object raises the object to a
transcendent position.
This
area of imaginary emotions is an area of vulnerability for us. In a more modern
model, every day our imaginary fear and paranoia is manipulated by both the
advertising industry and the Federal Government. It seems that whenever the people start paying attention to
government oversight, all of a sudden there is an Òorange terror alertÓ. The imaginary fear of personal attack
is triggered, and the people respond, by focusing on their own safety and
security. In the case of the
advertising industry, we are easily manipulated to view cigarette smoking as a
pariah, but fast food (probably MORE damaging to our bodies in the long run) as
perfectly ok, and in fact good
for our children.
I
will discuss manipulation of these emotions further in the Jesse Prinz section
of this paper.
Stocker
Michael
Stocker is one of many contemporary thinkers who believe that current cognitive
theories are incomplete when it comes to defining exactly what an emotion is.
ÒI
am concerned to show how, and if possible why, recent philosophical accounts of
people and even of emotions have ignored or misunderstood affectivity.Ó[3]
(feelings) His motivation for this concern began when, while attending a
philosophical association meeting, he observed one of the speakers having a
candid discussion with a group of people. The man in question was expressing
Òvery passionatelyÓ his opinion about the work of another philosopher. There
was no doubt about his opinion concerning the other philosopher. Later on,
Stocker approached the passionate philosopher and asked him if he thought that
emotions were related to thinking or intellect. The Passionate one said Òoh no,
emotions have nothing to do with thinking and evaluations of thinkingÓ. Stocker observed that the more the
passionate philosopher spoke and analyzed the other philosopherÕs work, the
more emotionally agitated he got. When Stocker asked him about it, the
passionate philosopher revealed that he was completely unaware that he was
doing it! (recollected from Ethics Interviews on the Web )
Stocker
defines a special type of feeling called ÒaffectivityÓ. Affectivity contains
two types of information, information about intentionality and information
about intensity. The intentionality of a feeling depends of course on the
intentional object. The intensity of a feeling sets the range between love and
lust, between annoyance and rage. The intentionality and intensity of affects
impose evaluative assessments on to our emotions.
Stocker
bases his theory on three principles. One: the absence of feelings
(affectivity) and in particular, emotions, is a signature characteristic of
mental illness. There is a primal care and concern which is essential for a
good life. When the care or concern disappears, that is a sign of illness. Two: without feelings we cannot live a
good human life. He suggests that someone without affectivity may not be human
at all. Three: any description of people which denies or omits that we are
feeling creatures is not talking about healthy, functional people.
Every
mode of thinking or intellectual process is full of emotionality. We donÕt need
to be aware of them when we experience them and we donÕt have to be aware that
we have them to experience them. A similar example would be that we donÕt have
to know that water is a hydrogen atom bonded with two oxygen atoms to know what
water is for and what itÕs used for.
When not required, emotions fade into the
background. But, the amount of emotion required for any given situation varies.
According to Stocker there is always, at the very least, an emotional
ÒinclinationÓ persisting in the background of all of our activities, and there
probably isnÕt as much time ÒbetweenÓ fully engaged emotional states as is
commonly thought. He defines these
emotional states in terms of ÒdispositionalÓ emotion and ÒoccurrentÓ emotion.
These terms are often used for the sake of simplicity, however this is a bad
idea, for Stocker believes that because of the affectiveness of emotion, two
terms and only two terms for types of emotional state are not appropriate. To
use his example, if I donÕt like you, IÕll probably be disposed, or more
inclined, to get angry at you quicker than at others, and even if IÕm relaxed
and calm, if I even think about you I can become irritated at you, you donÕt
even have to be present to cause it! Additionally, between times of really
being angry at you with you here, I can be angry at you well just because. This
is fully engaged anger, without direct provocation. As opposed to the anger triggered by the primary sense
experience of you being in my presence.
Prof.
Stocker firmly lands affectivity in the psyche. He does this specifically to
differentiate sense data (feelings associated with and originating from the
body parts) from the sort of feeling which cannot be so related. Affectivity is
experienced when we are curious about something, or interested in something.
Some emotions are combinations of bodily sensation and affectivity, sexual
arousal, exultation at the completion of a goal are both examples of this. What has disturbed Stocker is
that when many philosophers came
to the understanding that bodily feelings are not required to experience
emotion-which is true, then they took it a step too far and decided that ALL feelings were not required.
Stocker
is looking at previous theories of emotion with a magnifying glass. What he
sees is that when it comes to describing what an emotion is, the cognitive
theories and the Jamesean theories about the physiology of emotion are just not
enough.
Prinz
Jesse
Prinz seems to put together the sensible elements from historical and
contemporary views on emotions and their relationship to value judgment. He
uses brain activity scans to demonstrate that when we process a moral value
judgment, there is significant brain activity observed in the emotion
centers. This is particularly
evident in the case of judgments about morally wrong issues. Prinz believes that emotions are an
epiphenomenal event necessary for moral judgment; meaning all moral judgments
have emotional responses. This is a one directional statement. When we discuss
the mechanics of moral value judgments, emotions are always a part. If they are
not a part, then it is likely that the person is in some sort of psychotic or
disassociated state. He uses the
term ÒaffectÓ for this sort of emotional sensation.
He
is somewhat Darwinian in that he does believe that some value judgments appear
to be genetic. By demonstrating ÒdumbfoundingÓ he illustrates the point very
well. If you ask a group of people if incest is right or wrong, the far
majority will say that incest is indeed wrong. If they are asked why it is
wrong, the first argument is Òtheir children will be freaksÓ. So you answer: Òthey are using birth
control, so there is no possibility of offspringÓ, then ask again is incest
still wrong? And so on, you systematically counter the arguments about why it
is wrong until there are none left. Again ask Òis incest morally wrong?Ó In
spite of having no moral excuses, the great majority will still say Òyes,
incest is morally wrongÓ.
Dr.
PrinzÕ premise is that emotion drives basic moral values. The nature of the
emotion can be in the form or primary and secondary emotional experiences. Here
is a scenario: there is a railroad track with a switch to another set of
tracks, there are 5 people tied to
the straight bound railroad track.
There is one person tied to the track on the other side of the switch.
The train is coming. Away from both tracks here is one person at the lever of
the switch. The question is asked of a group Òis it ok if the person pulls the
lever to save the 5, but has to kill the one?Ó The majority of the group say
yes. The next question posed is: ÒYou are at the lever, you can pull it and
save 5, but you will kill one. Is it ok for you to do this?Ó Again the group
will say yes. Now, the question is posed a little differently ÒYou are standing
over the one person tied to the track, your lever is right here. If you pull
the lever you will save 5 but this person will die right before your eyes. Is
it ok to pull the leverÓ The majority here will answer ÒnoÓ! The puzzle was put
to the group in several slightly different ways, one permutation was that you
were in a room, and just told about the people tied to the track. In the room
you have a red button to activate the switch. All of the group said yes it was
ok to push the button.
Our
emotions can skew our moral judgments, and they can be manipulated to do so. A
test was done using hypnosis to suggest a negative emotional connection
attached to the word ÒoftenÓ. A
group was given this suggestion, and then asked to read some copy concerning a
man running for public office. One set of copy was favorable toward the
candidate, the other negative toward the candidate. Both sets of copy included
the word ÒoftenÓ. In both cases the group responded negatively toward the
candidate, and the group who had the negative copy AND the suggestion word,
responded even more negatively.
I
give these examples to illustrate that Dr. Prinz has been very thorough in his
attempt to show the variety of ways that emotions influence our moral
judgments.
Dr
Prinz believes that emotions are needed for moral judgments. Parents use negative emotional
associations to discipline their children. Whether its fear of corporal
punishment, withdrawal of love, or infliction of guilt, all are emotions which
become over time associated with inappropriate behavior and serve to deter it.
People who cannot properly emote are usually psychopathic. They do not experience
negative emotions. They may learn how to say this is morally wrong or that is
morally wrong, but what they are really saying is Òyou say this is morally wrongÓ They donÕt
really know what good or bad really means.
Prinz
likes HumeÕs description of emotions paraphrased as Òour belief that something
is morally good or morally bad is us having a sentiment
(approbation/disapprobation) towards it. In other words we experience an
emotion relative to a thing under moral consideration. Prinz breaks down the world
into 3 levels of moral code: Autonomy- the level of the individual, Divinity
Rules/Nature Rules- the level of small tribes, and the Community level – found in stratified societies. In the case of autonomy the victim is
an individual, actions are stealing, hitting, and the emotional response is
anger. At the level of Divinity Rules, there are purity norms: what you can
wear to church, body purity, sexual mores, the action are incest, aberrant
sexual activities, the emotion is disgust. We see that the respondent emotion
is specializing for a particular layer. The actions pertain to the individual,
but the emotions become more generalized, not so Òfirst personÓ. In the Community layer we see
activities like a teenager who does not give his seat to an elderly person,
etc. In the community there is an organization of parts, a natural order or
parts, well this is about people..so itÕs the natural order of people. The
emotion here is contempt.
Kant
suggests that reason influences moral context, Prinz suggests that actually
reason does not have much influence at all. At the level of basic moral values
reason is insufficient to have any effect at all.
Moral
judgments contain intense emotional responses. To completely understand where
they come from we need to completely understand where they come from at the
biological level at the societal level etc. We are disposed to act in certain
emotional ways. We associate with other individuals and groups of individuals
associate into societies. All shape moral judgments which are passed on to
children. If we want to get moral norms to change we need to start at the level
of emotions and reassign meaning. Look what a great job the anti smoking people
have done at assigning negativity toward smoking. Eating junk food is probably
more damaging, but the emotional vilification has not occurred with respect to
it. Some cultural event (gays getting married in San Francisco) can lead to
minor re-construal and eventually lead to significant change in moral values.
Conclusion
I like the primal drive
emotions..desire/pleasure/pain relative to survival. From Darwin I like his
idea of emotions being easier to trigger based on habit and repetition. I think
that the actual process of experiencing an emotion must be a combination of these.
But there is something ÒotherÓ. There is something beyond what we can describe
from within our physiological shells that is ÒemotionÓ. The bottom line for me is: All
descriptions or attempted definitions of what an emotion is fall short. No one
to date has actually gotten it right. It seems that once one area is focused
upon in detail, another aspect of the emotional experience is neglected. This
concept is understood in Taoism. Once you try to communicate what the Tao is,
you have lost it. So far the same seems to be true of emotions. I think that an
emotional experience is something other than the sum of itÕs parts.
I have a theory about mathematical
knowledge. This discussion from prinz about emotions and value judgments makes
me thing that it is more global than originally thought..I think the FI-FO is
based on information that is brought in a primary fashionÉ
Our good, well formed moral judgments are
based on the existence of an emotional connection. Value judgments are harder
to make if there is an emotional
connection and so they should be. We can
ÒinviteÓ a primary experience; after all we canÕt have first person
experience with every issue that we may be asked to make a decision aboutÉbut
we can invite an emotional connection by virtue of the self education we
perform on an issue. IÕve never had an abortion, but I can educate myself about
both sides with as much true information I can get so that I am moved
passionately toward one decision or another. The danger however is in the classic flaw that Darwin and
Hume are guilty of. This journey of self education must be one of honest
scholarship and not one of finding evidence for a position already chosen. It
must be an opportunity for real knowledge, not the propagation of fear.
I strongly agree that emotions are
integral to moral judgment. Without emotions, our judgments are merely
mathematical ratios of probability. The screen play for the recent film ÒI
RobotÓ stated it well. The main character, Spooner, hates robots. The reason is
because of an accident which occurred when he was younger. The accident
involved himself and a child each in separate cars. The cars were underwater.
The car that the child was in was filling rapidly as was his. A robot came
down, and based on the filling speed of the cars would only be able to rescue
one person. The robot calculated the survival possibilities and rescued
Spooner, the child drowned. Spooner tried to order the robot to rescue the
child, but the robot is just a number crunching machine basically. It has not
capacity for compassion or self sacrifice. It has no capacity for transcendent
thinking. So, mathematics won out.
Emotions are precious, they set us apart. They
make us creatures capable of ethical consideration and conduct. The genetic
tendency to a certain view makes us vulnerable, and open for manipulation. The
level of influence of our emotions on our ethical choices is both subtle and
bold. Awareness is the key.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
What is an
Emotion, Robert C. Solomon, Oxford University
Press,
2003
A History of
Western Philosophy, Vol. 3, Hobbes to Hume, W.T.
Jones
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc 1969
A Treatise of
Human Nature, Online Reference for leading quote only
Introduction to
World Philosophy, Elliot Deutsch, Prentice Hall,
1997
Philosophy
History and Problems, Samuel Enoch Stumph, Mc-
Graw
Hill Inc, 1994
Class Notes,
Philosophy 455, Advanced Philosophy of Mind,
Instructor:
Prof York Gunther, CSUN, October, 2004
The Wisdom of the
West, Bertrand Russell, Rathbone Books Ltd,
London
PDF Version of
the Chapter on Darwin, Deception and Facial
Expressions
Valuing Emotions,
Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Series,
first two chapters,
Xerox copy, no publication
info.
Introducing
Ethics, Dave Robinson, Chris Garratt, Totem Books, 1997
the Elements of
Moral Philosophy, James Rachels, Second Edition, Mc- Graw
Hill, 1993
The Right Thing
to Do, James Rachels, Second Edition, Mc-Graw Hill, 1999
Notes from
Seminar ÒThe Emotional Basis of MoralsÓ by Jesse Prinz, at Caltech, on Monday November 15, 2004
Manuscript:
ÒEmotions EmbodiedÓ, Jesse Prinz, University of North Carolina at Capitol Hill, under review, 2004
The Sacred and
The Profane, Mircea Eliade, 1957 Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, English
translation 1959, Harcourt Brace and Co.