Donna
Chapman Philosophy 455
donna@sypub.com Adv. Philosophy of
Mind
October
26, 2004
Fall 2004
Is Feeling Necessary for
Emotion?
Discuss the views of
David Hume and Michael Stocker with Opposing View from Piotr Winkeilman.
(rough draft)
In this paper I will explore the nature of
feelings and emotion. Views vary concerning whether or not feelings (physical
sensations, yearnings, desires) are necessary for emotion to exist or occur.
Davie Hume and Michael Stocker both believe that feelings, or ÒaffectivityÓ as
Stocker would put it, are absolutely required for a state to be called an
ÒemotionÓ. They both go so far as to say that the feeling is the qualifier. In
HumeÕs case the feeling is
the emotion. In StockerÕs case, the indicator that an emotion is happening is
the ÒaffectivityÓ that is associated with it. Piotr Winkeilman believes that
emotions operate on an unconscious level. Not ÒsubÓ conscious, but unconscious.
As such unconscious emotions can affect our responses to situations without our
even being aware of it.
Hume
ÒReason is and ought only to be the slave
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and
obey themÓ[1]
David Hume does not speak of the ÒoriginsÓ
of emotions, but he does say a lot ÒaboutÓ them.
Hume theorizes that all mental perceptions
are of two types, impressions and ideas. All impressions are emotions.
Impressions are differentiated by quality and intensity. There are two types of
impressions: original (sensation) and secondary (reflection). Sensations are a primary sense
experience sort of impression, while reflection is a secondary sense experience
type, or one step removed from the real thing. Vivid spontaneous emotions are
sensations, Memories of these sensations are reflections.
Hume says that sensations arise in the
soul without any sort of direct perception, (but are nevertheless primary sense
experiences). They also arise from primary data from the physical senses. Reflections proceed from sensations.
Sensations pertain to direct sense data, while reflections are a lesser
version. Reflective impressions are of two types: calm and violent. Hume
further differentiates violent reflective impressions as ÒpassionsÓ. There are
two categories of passion: direct and indirect. Direct and indirect passions
each have their own distinct causation. Direct passions are caused as the name
implies, by feelings directly. They are unique instances like no other.
Emotions such as grief or joy are direct in that they are caused only by
feelings of pleasure or pain. Indirect passions are a composite of feeling and
intentionality, or belief about the object of the emotion. HumeÕs most detailed
extrapolation concerns the emotion of pride. In the case of pride, the
intentional object is the self.
Hume strongly asserts that emotions of
themselves are agnostic. They are neither good nor bad. Only at the level of
indirect passion does the
intentional object render an emotion good, bad, positive or negative. If the
intentional object is a moral judgment or an ethical view, then it can be
swayed positive or negative based on our approbation (sentiment) toward or
against it at the time. Emotions themselves are inherently benign.
HumeÕs theory has several problems. The
most difficult to overcome is the potential for non-reasonable behavior. His
view makes it completely acceptable to do something purely because we desire it
or ÒfeelÓ drawn to do it, without any consideration for the well being of
others, or even common sense. Because we can desire to do anything, as long as
the object of our desire does not turn out to be flawed or non-existent.
Anything goes. Another problem is that heÕs an empiricist. He ascribes a rock
solid dependence on sense data input as criteria for all knowledge. He has just
told us that non-empirical entities exist (sensations/impressions). He says
that we cannot know what the passions are (because we canÕt experience them in
a primary way), then proceeds to describe them in empirical detail.
Stocker
Michael
Stocker is one of many contemporary thinkers who believe that current cognitive
theories are incomplete when it comes to defining exactly what an emotion is.
ÒI
am concerned to show how, and if possible why, recent philosophical accounts of
people and even of emotions have ignored or misunderstood affectivity.Ó[2]
(feelings) His motivation for this concern began when, while attending a
philosophical association meeting, he observed one of the speakers having a
candid discussion with a group of people. The man in question was expressing
Òvery passionatelyÓ his opinion about the work of another philosopher. There
was no doubt about his opinion concerning the other philosopher. Later on, Stocker
approached the passionate philosopher and asked him if he thought that emotions
were related to thinking or intellect. The Passionate one said Òoh no, emotions
have nothing to do with thinking and evaluations of thinkingÓ. Stocker observed that the more the
passionate philosopher spoke and analyzed the other philosopherÕs work, the
more emotionally agitated he got. When Stocker asked him about it, the
passionate philosopher revealed that he was completely unaware that he was
behaving emotionally! (recollected from Ethics Interviews on the Web )
Stocker
defines a special type of feeling called ÒaffectivityÓ. Affectivity contains
two types of information, information about intentionality and information
about intensity. The intentionality of a feeling depends of course on the
intentional object. The intensity of a feeling sets the range between love and
lust, between annoyance and rage. The intentionality and intensity of affects
impose evaluative assessments on to our emotions.
Stocker
bases his theory on three principles. One: the absence of feelings
(affectivity) and in particular, emotions, is a signature characteristic of
mental illness. There is a primal care and concern which is essential for a
good life. When the care or concern disappears, that is a sign of illness. Two: without feelings we cannot live a
good human life. He suggests that someone without affectivity may not be human
at all. Three: any description of people which denies or omits that we are
feeling creatures is not talking about healthy, functional people.
Every
mode of thinking or intellectual process is full of emotionality. We donÕt need
to be aware of them when we experience them and we donÕt have to be aware that
we have them to experience them. A similar example would be that we donÕt have
to know that water is a hydrogen atom bonded with two oxygen atoms to know what
water is for and what itÕs used for.
When not required, emotions fade into the
background. But, the amount of emotion required for any given situation varies.
According to Stocker there is always, at the very least, an emotional
ÒinclinationÓ persisting in the background of all of our activities, and there
probably isnÕt as much time ÒbetweenÓ fully engaged emotional states as is
commonly thought. He defines these
emotional states in terms of ÒdispositionalÓ emotion and ÒoccurrentÓ emotion.
These terms are often used for the sake of simplicity, however this is a bad
idea, for Stocker believes that because of the affectiveness of emotion, two
terms and only two terms for types of emotional state are not appropriate. To
use his example, if I donÕt like you, IÕll probably be disposed, or more
inclined, to get angry at you quicker than at others, and even if IÕm relaxed
and calm, if I even think about you I can become irritated at you, you donÕt
even have to be present to cause it! Additionally, between times of really
being angry at you with you here, I can be angry at you well just because. This
is fully engaged anger, without direct provocation. As opposed to the anger triggered by the primary sense
experience of you being in my presence.
Prof.
Stocker firmly lands affectivity in the psyche. He does this specifically to
differentiate sense data (feelings associated with and originating from the
body parts) from the sort of feeling which cannot be so related. Affectivity is
experienced when we are curious about something, or interested in something.
Some emotions are combinations of bodily sensation and affectivity, sexual
arousal, exultation at the completion of a goal are both examples of this. What has disturbed Stocker is
that when many philosophers came
to the understanding that bodily feelings are not required to experience
emotion-which is true, then they took it a step too far and decided that ALL feelings were not required.
Stocker
is looking at previous theories of emotion with a magnifying glass. What he
sees is that when it comes to describing what an emotion is, the cognitive
theories and the Jamesean theories about the physiology of emotion are just not
enough.
Winkeilman
Winkeilman
thinks that emotions involve a process that he calls ÒembodimentÓ. Embodiment
pertains to the physiological processes associated with emotions. This process
is triggered by either the physical presence of an elicitor, or by reference to it. The reference elicitor can
be in the form of a thought, memory, photograph or written word. He hints in a
vaguely Jamesean way to physiological necessity when describing what an emotion actually is. He quantifies
emotion in the physical process, with out giving ÒfeelingsÓ or ÒinclinationsÓ
any weight at all. He does not believe that conscious feelings are a necessary
component of emotion, and goes on to theorize that emotions themselves can be
completely unconscious. He believes that these unconscious emotions can
influence our evaluative and preferential judgments.
Weinkelman believes that to prove
unconscious emotion we need to illustrate by experiment that a persons
behavior shows evidence of an
emotional reaction taking place while the person is unaware of a conscious
feeling with respect to that behavior.
The following experiment was conducted in
an effort to prove the un-conscious embodiment of emotions. First a group of subjects were asked if
they were thirsty. Then they were shown Chinese ideographs, preceded by
subliminally presented happy or sad faces. Afterwards the subjects did a taste
test with a lemon-lime beverage. Then afterward they were shown a neutral face
and asked whether it was male or female. Afterward one group was asked to pour
a drink, taste it and rate it. The other group were asked to take a small sip
from a prepared cup. When asked
how they felt, none of the subjects reported any change in feelings that could
be based on the subliminal information, however, their consumption ratings were influenced by them! Thirsty people poured
more, and drank more after happy faces than after sad faces. In spite of the instructions, the
people who were shown happy faces likes the neutral face, and those shown the
angry face disliked it. When asked about what they felt during the rating
process they said that they were aware of no mood changes.
Winkeilman is convinced, that this
experiment, proves that positive and negative emotions (he uses the terms
ÒlikeÓ and ÒdislikeÓ) can be triggered subliminally, and that these triggered
responses can and do stay below the radar of the conscious mind. We respond to
a situation in a specific way, we are unaware of a reason why we are responding
in this way, and we are unable to consciously discern anything about the state.
The
problem with this view is that the experiment, although producing interesting
results, really only proves that the subconscious mind is recording everything
all the time. It doesnÕt miss much and it can be manipulated (triggered to
output data). But these induced simulated states that Winkeilman calls
Òemotional responsesÓ may not truly be emotional experiences at all. Responses
are not experiences. He asks questions about ÒpronessÓ or ÒdispositionÓ toward a
given emotional state. In the past movie theatres used to put subliminal frames
into the features to drive the concession stand sales. Sometimes the scenes
were hot arid deserts. The concession stands sales of drinks went up, but the
question was never asked properly or in the right timeline: do you ÒwantÓ a
drink? Or are you thirsty? We
donÕt know. In the same way, the results do not indicate that the emotional
state was actually achieved.
Somehow I just donÕt think that drinking lots of soda after having
subconsciously recorded happy faces means that you are experiencing no
conscious emotional feelings. There may something to WeinkelmanÕs theory, but
his experiments did not prove it.
Conclusion
It bothers me a lot that emotions are
thought so negatively of and often have been ignored by the philosophical
community. It bothers me that philosophers in the past have not factored crazy
people in various states of mental illness, and hormones into the discussion of
the identity of emotions generally and what constitutes an emotion
specifically.
Stocker is on the right track. He and
other philosophers like Jesse Prinz are keenly aware that yes genetics is part
of it but not all of it. Cognition is part of it but not all of it. Crazy
people are classic examples of what it looks like when emotional structure is
flawed. Social Relativism does
contribute to the long term identity of emotions but its not the only
contributor. It seems like all the
philosophers and psychologists have are pieces of the puzzle. It would be nice
to put the pieces together.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
What is an
Emotion, Robert C. Solomon, Oxford University
Press,
2003
A History of
Western Philosophy, Vol. 3, Hobbes to Hume, W.T.
Jones
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc 1969
A Treatise of
Human Nature, Online Reference for leading quote only
Introduction to
World Philosophy, Elliot Deutsch, Prentice Hall,
1997
Philosophy
History and Problems, Samuel Enoch Stumph, Mc-
Graw
Hill Inc, 1994
Class Notes,
Philosophy 455, Advanced Philosophy of Mind,
Instructor:
Prof York Gunther, CSUN, October, 2004
The Wisdom of the
West, Bertrand Russell, Rathbone Books Ltd,
London
PDF Version of
the Chapter on Darwin, Deception and Facial
Expressions
Valuing Emotions,
Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Series,
first two chapters,
Xerox copy, no publication
info.
Ethics Interviews
on the Web, Moral Theory: Schizophrenia, Pluralism and Emotion, an interview with Professor
Michael Stocker, Syracuse University,
March 3, 2001
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/video/Interviews/stocker/index.html
Introducing
Ethics, Dave Robinson, Chris Garratt, Totem Books, 1997
the Elements of
Moral Philosophy, James Rachels, Second Edition, Mc- Graw
Hill, 1993
The Right Thing
to Do, James Rachels, Second Edition, Mc-Graw Hill, 1999
Notes from
Seminar ÒThe Emotional Basis of MoralsÓ by Jesse Prinz, at Caltech, on Monday November 15, 2004
Manuscript:
ÒEmotions EmbodiedÓ, Jesse Prinz, University of North Carolina at Capitol Hill, under review, 2004
Unconscious
Emotion, Piotr Winkeilman and Kent C. Berridge, Current Directions
in Phychological Science, 2004
Downloaded
from: http://psy.ucsd.edu/~pwinkiel/
What is an
Unconscious Emotion? Piotr Winkeilman and Kent C. Berridge, Cognition and Emotion,
2003
Piotr
Winkeilman and Kent C. Berridge